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Abstract: Consciousness is scientifically challenging to study because 
of its subjective aspect. This leads researchers to rely on report-based 
experimental paradigms in order to discover neural correlates of con-
sciousness (NCCs). I argue that the reliance on reports has biased the 
search for NCCs, thus creating what I call ‘methodological artefacts’. 
This paper has three main goals: first, describe the measurement 
problem in consciousness science and argue that this problem led to 
the emergence of methodological artefacts. Second, provide a critical 
assessment of the NCCs put forward by the global neuronal work-
space theory. Third, provide the means of dissociating genuine NCCs 
from methodological artefacts. 
1. Introduction 
Consciousness is subjective: only the subject having a conscious 
experience has direct access to it. Contrary to a third-person observer, 
a subject having a conscious experience does not have to infer from 
her behaviour that she has that experience. Subjects have a first-
person privileged access to their own conscious experiences: intro-
spection is the cognitive capacity that enables this subjective access 
(Shoemaker, 1996; Bar-On, 2004). Introspection is a special kind of 
metacognition, defined broadly as the activity of thinking about our 
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own thoughts. I define introspection as the capacity to select specific 
information among consciously accessible contents, allowing for sub-
sequent report of this information. Because introspection is subjective, 
a third-person observer can only infer that a subject has a conscious 
experience from her report or behaviour. 
The subjective aspect of consciousness is what makes its scientific 
study so challenging. At least since Crick and Koch’s seminal article 
(1990), which set out the agenda for current scientific research, one of 
the main goals of the scientific study of consciousness is to uncover 
the neural basis of consciousness, also called ‘neural correlates of con-
sciousness’ (NCCs). Within this framework, research in consciousness 
science, such as the influential research programme of the ‘global 
neuronal workspace theory’ (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Dehaene 
and Changeux, 2011; Dehaene, 2014), relied on report-based methods 
in order to infer, from the subjects’ reports, that they have conscious 
experiences caused by stimuli displayed by the experimenters (which 
is a necessary first step toward obtaining NCCs). However, mounting 
evidence suggests that NCCs discovered by consciousness science in 
the past twenty years could be artefacts due to the use of report-based 
methods, rather than proper NCCs (Aru et al., 2012; De Graaf, Hsieh 
and Sack, 2012; Tsuchiya et al., 2015). 
In this paper, I argue that the requirement of reports has biased the 
search for proper NCCs, thus creating what I call ‘methodological 
artefacts’. By comparing results from no-report paradigms, studies on 
the neural basis of introspection, and report-based paradigms, I argue 
that the main neural correlates of consciousness discovered by propo-
nents of the global neuronal workspace theory of consciousness might 
be methodological artefacts. I then argue that, in order to study con-
sciousness, one must begin with the study of the neural states that 
underlie introspection. Only then can we dissociate methodological 
artefacts from NCCs. 
2. NCCs and Methodological Artefacts 
In this section, I clarify the notion of NCCs and point to different 
ways in which experimenters could be misled when trying to uncover 
NCCs. I show that one of these problems could lead to the mis-
identification of neural states created by the act of introspection as 
genuine NCCs, I call this particular kind of misidentified NCC 
‘methodological artefacts’. 
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NCCs of a conscious experience C are defined as the minimal set of 
neural states N that are jointly sufficient for C, given appropriate 
enabling conditions (Chalmers, 2000; Koch, 2004). If a neural state N 
is an NCC, then N must be sufficient for a particular conscious experi-
ence C, because the activation of the relevant neural state must lead to 
C by itself.1 If N is an NCC for a conscious experience C, no brain 
activity over and above N is required for C to occur. As Hohwy and 
Bayne (2015) point out, some other neural state Nʹ may be required 
for a creature to be in a neural state N. In such case, Nʹ is not an NCC, 
but a prerequisite for consciousness. Indeed, NCCs must be minimally 
sufficient for consciousness, because one wants to isolate only the 
neural features that are involved in a particular conscious state, and 
not neural prerequisites or neural consequences of consciousness (Aru 
et al., 2012; 2015; De Graaf, Hsieh and Sack, 2012). A prerequisite of 
consciousness is a neural state that occurs upstream from the NCC, 
and may be necessary for a conscious experience, but is not a genuine 
NCC. For example, although activity on my retina is necessary for my 
having a conscious visual experience of a rose, it is not because of that 
activity that the visual percept of a rose is conscious rather than 
unconscious. Hence, activity on my retina does not qualify as an NCC. 
Rather, it is a prerequisite for my having the conscious experience of a 
rose. A consequence of consciousness is a neural state that results 
from a conscious experience and may often co-occur with this experi-
ence without being an NCC. For example, having a conscious visual 
experience of a rose could make me think about the smell of a rose, 
and therefore lead to the activation of a neural state that correlates 
with thinking about the smell of a rose, without these neural states 
having anything to do with the percept of a rose being conscious. One 
should therefore not conflate NCCs with prerequisites and con-
sequences of consciousness. 
In trying to establish the NCCs, consciousness science typically 
relies on ‘contrastive analysis’ (Baars, 1988; Aru et al., 2012). Con-
trastive analysis consists in comparing behavioural characteristics or 
                                                          
1  It is still debated whether the search for NCCs is a search for the minimally sufficient 
neural causes of consciousness, neural constituents of consciousness, or neural correl-
ates of consciousness (Neisser, 2012; Miller, 2014). I will not enter into this debate in 
this paper: while it is sometimes difficult to avoid a ‘causal’ language on this matter, I 
will assume that the C in NCCs stands for ‘correlates’, as the use of this neutral 
language frees us from the debate on the mind/body relations and is widely used both in 
the philosophical and scientific literature on consciousness. 
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neural activity on trials in which a subject either consciously or 
unconsciously perceives a stimulus while holding the stimulus con-
stant (for example, thanks to backward masking or binocular rivalry; 
see Kim and Blake, 2005). In a backward masking experiment, for 
example, a target stimulus becomes invisible for a subject because a 
second stimulus (i.e. the mask) is presented close in time and space to 
the target. If the stimulus is flashed around 50 ms before the mask, 
subjects tend to consciously perceive the target on some trials and not 
on others (in which it is only subliminally perceived), allowing experi-
menters to manipulate the subject’s conscious perception while hold-
ing a stimulus constant. Experimenters then compare neural activity of 
a subject on trials in which she reported consciously perceiving the 
stimulus with neural activity on trials in which she reported no experi-
ence. Experimenters then infer neural states that correlate with a con-
scious experience from the difference in neural activity between con-
scious and unconscious trials. As noted by Overgaard (2006), in 
report-based paradigms, one obtains NCCs by matching two 
measures: first, an objective measure of the neural activity of the 
subject by a measuring apparatus (fMRI, EEG, MEG, etc.); second, a 
subjective detection of her own state of consciousness by the subject 
through introspection and subsequent report (verbal report, button 
pushes, etc.) (see Figure 1). From the measure of the neural activity, 
experimenters infer that a particular neural state is realized in the 
brain, and from the report of the subject, experimenters infer that she 
has or does not have a conscious experience of the stimulus. 
Overgaard thus concludes that: 
to derive the desired correlation, the ‘NCC’, from the actual data, one is 
fully dependent on the nature of the relation between the brain state and 
the measure hereof, on the one hand, and the relation between the 
conscious state and the report on the other. (ibid.) 
Indeed, on this model, one obtains NCCs only if the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
On the objective side of the process: (1) the measuring apparatus 
accurately measures neural activity, (2) experimenters correctly infer 
the actual brain state from the measured neural activity, and (3) they 
isolate neural states that correlate with the conscious experience by 
screening off both neural prerequisites and neural consequences of 
consciousness. 
On the subjective side of the process: (4) the subject accurately 
detects the presence or absence of a conscious experience by 
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introspection; (5) she adequately reports what she introspects; (6) 
experimenters interpret the subject’s report such that they correctly 
infer her conscious state. 
 
Figure 1. Source: Overgaard (2015). In order to obtain proper NCCs 
(pNCC), one has to obtain a correlation between a brain state and a con-
scious experience. But experimenters cannot directly access brain states 
nor conscious experiences. Hence, they correlate two measures instead: a 
subjective detection, the subject’s report of having (or not having) a con-
scious experience, and an objective measure, obtained by a measuring 
apparatus, of the neural activity. The result is not a pNCC, but only a 
measured NCC (mNCC), from which experimenters then try to infer pNCC. 
I already explained how the objective measure can go wrong: the 
neural state inferred from the measured neural activity may be a pre-
requisite or a consequence of consciousness, not a real NCC, and it is 
difficult to disentangle NCCs from these other factors. But, for con-
sciousness science, the real trouble stems from the use of introspection 
and the nature of the relation between conscious states and subjective 
reports. I see three main ways in which the subjective measure can 
bias the search for NCCs: (1) introspection may fail to detect 
occurrent conscious episodes, or in other words, introspection might 
not be exhaustive (Overgaard and Sandberg, 2012; Timmermans and 
Cleeremans, 2015); (2) introspection may not be exclusive: it may 
misclassify information that is not conscious as conscious 
(Timmermans et al., 2010); (3) neural prerequisites, neural correlates, 
and neural consequences of introspection may be conflated with 
NCCs. Neural correlates of introspection (NCIs), just as in the case of 
NCCs, are the set of neural states that are jointly minimally sufficient 
for introspection of a mental state. A neural prerequisite of intro-
spection is a neural state that is necessary for introspection to detect a 
conscious mental state, but is not part of the neural states that are 
sufficient for this introspection to occur. A neural consequence of 
introspection is a neural state that may co-occur with introspection 
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without being necessary nor sufficient for it (such as neural states that 
underpin verbal reports or button pressings during an experiment for 
example). 
The first kind of bias is the subject of a long lasting debate about 
whether or not phenomenal consciousness (what the experience is like 
for the subject) overflows cognitive access (what is available for a 
subject to report). Some claim that the scope of access is identical to 
the scope of consciousness, and hence that introspection is exhaustive, 
because all conscious contents would thus be available for intro-
spection and subsequent report (Cohen and Dennett, 2011; Cohen, 
Dennett and Kanwisher, 2016; Dehaene, 2014), while proponents of 
phenomenal overflow claim that it is not (Block, 1995; 2007; 
Bronfman et al., 2014). I won’t take a stand on this debate in this 
paper.2 The second kind of bias has been extensively studied by cog-
nitive scientists and philosophers inspired by signal detection theory: 
experimenters try to uncover unconscious influences on metacog-
nition, which might bias the subjective measure provided by the sub-
jects’ reports (Irvine, 2012; Newell and Shanks 2014). Here, I will be 
interested in the third kind of bias due to the use of introspection in 
consciousness science; namely, the mistake of conflating neural pre-
requisites, correlates, or consequences of introspection and NCCs. I 
use the term ‘methodological artefacts’ for NCCs that result from this 
latter kind of mistake. 
 Methodological artefact: neural state that is a prerequisite, a 
correlate, or a consequence of introspection, but is misidentified 
by experimenters as a genuine NCC. 
To illustrate this notion, let’s imagine that activation of the prefrontal 
cortex is necessary for introspection of a conscious experience, with-
out being part of the states that are jointly minimally sufficient for this 
experience (NCC). In such a case, if experimenters rely only on 
report-based paradigms, activation of the prefrontal cortex will always 
co-occur with the presence of a conscious experience. Every time the 
experimenter will require the subject to introspect her conscious 
experience in order to report it, the prefrontal cortex will be activated. 
                                                          
2  Nonetheless, I want to put forward an important distinction between access conscious-
ness and introspection. While all access-conscious contents are available to be targets of 
introspection, not all access-conscious contents are introspected. As Block writes 
‘[access]-consciousness… requires no introspection’ (Block. 1995, p. 280). 
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This co-occurence could lead experimenters to mistake the activation 
of the prefrontal cortex for a genuine NCC. Activation of the pre-
frontal cortex would thus be a methodological artefact. The challenge 
of the measurement problem in consciousness science is to dis-
entangle genuine NCCs from methodological artefacts. 
Before I explain in more detail the challenge of the measurement 
problem, there is a point that needs some clarification. It is often pre-
supposed in the literature that the mistake of conflating methodol-
ogical artefacts and NCCs is identical to the mistake of conflating 
consequences of consciousness and NCCs (Aru et al., 2012; 2015; De 
Graaf, Hsieh and Sack, 2012; Tsuchiya et al., 2015). Although Aru et 
al. (2012) or Bachmann (2009) take into account prerequisites of 
consciousness as potential confounds in the search for NCCs, one 
should further distinguish between the prerequisites of consciousness 
and the prerequisites of introspection, as they could be different and 
could therefore constitute independent sources of errors. It is possible 
that asking subjects to report their experience modifies the processing 
of information downstream but also upstream from consciousness. In 
other words, asking the subjects for reports may modify both neural 
states that precede consciousness and neural states that follow it. 
Indeed, neural prerequisites of introspection may well be active before 
the conscious experience itself. A study by Overgaard (2006) shows 
that asking subjects for reports modifies early perceptual processes 
rather than only post-perceptual processes. Some neural prerequisites 
of introspection such as the neural states underlying attention may 
modify early perceptual processes independently of consciousness 
(Kentridge, Nijboer and Heywood, 2008; Norman, Heywood and 
Kentridge, 2013). Hence, if the requirement for reports can modify 
neural states upstream from consciousness, neural prerequisites and 
correlates of introspection should not be considered only as neural 
consequences of consciousness. The mistake of conflating NCCs and 
methodological artefacts is thus different from the mistake of con-
flating NCCs and consequences of consciousness. 
Now that the two kinds of mistakes are disentangled, I will focus 
only on the mistake of conflating NCCs and methodological artefacts. 
The challenge raised by the potential presence of methodological 
artefacts in consciousness science stems from the fact that there is no 
a priori link between neural states that are necessary or sufficient for 
introspection and neural states that are minimally sufficient for a con-
scious experience (NCCs). Of particular difficulty is the task of dis-
entangling genuine NCCs from necessary prerequisites of 
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introspection and NCIs. Indeed, if a neural state N is necessary for 
introspection of a conscious state C, then N is necessary for the sub-
jective detection of C, and hence N will likely appear as an NCC. To 
see how the challenge generalizes to every NCC so far discovered 
through report-based paradigms, let me put the argument in a more 
formal way: 
The methodological artefact argument: 
(1) If introspection is necessary to detect the presence or absence of 
conscious experience C, and if a neural state N is necessary for 
introspection, then N is necessary to detect C. 
(2) Hence, for every detection of C, there is a neural state N, such 
that N is necessary for detecting C. 
(3) But N being necessary for detecting C does not imply that N is 
necessary nor sufficient for C. 
(4) Hence, every N appearing to be necessary or sufficient for C may 
not be necessary nor sufficient for C (but may only be necessary 
for detecting C). Consequently, every N appearing to be 
necessary or sufficient for C on the basis of a report-based para-
digm could be a methodological artefact. 
Now, the argument only shows that NCCs so far discovered thanks to 
report-based methods could be methodological artefacts, it does not 
show that they are. Moreover, it is not sufficient to show that a neural 
state identified as an NCC is a neural prerequisite or a neural correlate 
of introspection in order to show that it is a methodological artefact. 
For it could very well be that some prerequisites or NCIs are also 
genuine NCCs. There could be some overlap between neural correl-
ates and prerequisites of introspection and NCCs. Going back to the 
example of the activation of the prefrontal cortex: it could be that 
activation of the prefrontal cortex is a neural prerequisite or correlate 
of introspection while still being a genuine NCC. Hence, what is 
needed to demonstrate the existence of a methodological artefact is 
evidence that a neural state identified as an NCC is a neural pre-
requisite, a neural correlate, or a neural consequence of introspection, 
and evidence that the NCC has been misidentified as such from an 
independent source of knowledge that gathers data without relying on 
reports (i.e. no-report paradigms).3 
                                                          
3  I want to stress that my line of argument should be distinguished from the traditional 
no-report argument, according to which neuroscientists confound the neural states 
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Despite the difficulty of showing that a given identified NCC really 
is a methodological artefact, it is still possible to make a case against 
the identification of certain neural states as NCCs by comparing data 
from report-based paradigms, no-report paradigms, and studies on the 
neural basis of introspection. The general argument that I put forward 
in the next section takes the form of an inference to the best explana-
tion: if (1) N is identified as an NCC by report-based methods, (2) N 
is not identified as an NCC by no-report paradigms, (3) N is known to 
be a neural prerequisite, correlate, or consequence of introspection; 
then, the best explanation of the discrepancy between (1) and (2) is 
that N is a methodological artefact. Of course, the more (2) and (3) are 
firmly grounded, the more the argument is convincing. Although no-
report paradigms and the study of the neural basis of introspection are 
still at an emerging stage of their development (Fleming and Dolan, 
2012; Tsuchiya et al., 2015), I argue in the next section that there is 
already convincing evidence that the main NCCs uncovered by the 
influential global neuronal workspace theory of consciousness are 
methodological artefacts. 
Before applying the methodological argument to the global neuronal 
workspace theory, I want to address a potential concern. One might 
argue that the methodological artefact argument tacitly relies on a 
first-order view of consciousness: if it turns out that introspection and 
consciousness are the same, as might be supposed by proponents of 
higher-order thought theories of consciousness, then alleged methodo-
logical artefacts will also turn out to be genuine NCCs. 
Higher-order thought theorists argue that consciousness of a first-
order state arises from a second-order thought, representation, or per-
ception of this first-order state (Armstrong, 1968; Lau, 2008; Lycan, 
1996; Rosenthal, 2005). Now, could this second-order thought, repre-
sentation, or perception be identical with introspection itself? It seems 
that most higher-order thought theorists would resist this claim. The 
leading higher-order thought theorist, David Rosenthal, explicitly 
                                                                                                                  
associated with reports and the neural states associated with consciousness itself. 
Although this is a genuine problem, my argument is more encompassing. On my view, a 
report is a consequence of introspection. One could still confound the NCCs and the 
NCIs without relying on reports, for it is perfectly possible that subjects are still intro-
specting and monitoring their experiences during experiments using no-report para-
digms (Overgaard and Fazekas, 2016). Hence, although they can help disentangle NCCs 
from NCIs, no-report paradigms fail to do so by themselves. 
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distinguishes between a second-order thought rendering a first-order 
state conscious, and introspection: 
It is important to distinguish a mental state’s being conscious from our 
being introspectively aware of that state… introspection is a more 
complex phenomenon than the ordinary consciousness of mental states. 
Intuitively, a mental state’s being conscious means just that it occurs in 
our stream of consciousness. Introspection, by contrast, involves con-
sciously and deliberately paying attention to our contemporaneous 
mental states. (Rosenthal, 2005, pp. 27–8) 
If the relevant higher-order states are different from introspection, the 
methodological artefact argument still applies. Indeed, the methodol-
ogical argument only requires consciousness to be different from the 
capacity to select an accessible content by top-down or voluntary 
attention in order to report being conscious of it (i.e. introspection).4 
Without entering further into this debate, I now apply the methodol-
ogical artefact argument to the global neuronal workspace theory. 
3. NCCs of the GNW Theory: 
The P3b and Prefrontal Cortex Activations 
as Methodological Artefacts 
One of the most important theories of consciousness of the last twenty 
years, initially developed by Baars (1988), is the global neuronal 
workspace (GNW) theory of consciousness (de Gardelle and Kouider, 
2009). The main claim of the GNW theory is that consciousness 
results from the global broadcast of information to many distant areas 
of the brain through a global neuronal workspace (Dehaene and 
Naccache, 2001; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Dehaene, 2014). 
Accordingly, consciousness is identical to ‘the selection, amplifica-
tion, and global broadcasting, to many different areas, of a single 
piece of information selected for its salience or relevance to current 
goals’ (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). On the GNW theory, a content 
is consciously experienced if and only if it is selected by attention to 
be in the GNW for subsequent global broadcast. The GNW is thought 
to be implemented by a prefronto-parietal network (Dehaene and 
                                                          
4  Moreover, suggesting that consciousness is identical with introspection would commit 
one to the claim that voluntary attention is necessary for consciousness, which seems 
inconsistent with the growing consensus in cognitive science that it is not (e.g. Aru and 
Bachmann, 2013; Bronfman et al., 2014; Lamme, 2004; Li et al., 2002; Tallon-Baudry, 
2012; Van Boxtel, Tsuchiya and Koch, 2010; but see Cohen et al., 2012). 
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Naccache, 2001): a conscious content is encoded by the sustained 
activity of a fraction of the GNW neurons in the prefronto-parietal 
network, the long-distance axons of pyramidal cells in these areas 
allowing for the broadcast of the selected information throughout the 
cortex. The GNW theory predicts that consciousness correlates with 
an all-or-none and late (around 300 ms after stimulus onset) activation 
of the prefronto-parietal network, corresponding to the global broad-
cast of information. This global broadcast responsible for conscious-
ness also correlates with an event-related potential (the electrophysiol-
ogical activity in the brain in response to a particular event) appearing 
only when information becomes conscious, around 300 ms after 
stimulus onset, called the P3b wave (or just P3b for short). Hence, 
according to the GNW theory, both the late and all-or-none activation 
of the prefronto-parietal network and the P3b are NCCs. 
At first, there seems to be extensive evidence in favour of a late and 
all-or-none activation of the prefronto-parietal network being a 
reliable NCC. Indeed, using contrastive analysis, experimenters 
observe an all-or-none, late (from 300 ms), and sustained firing in the 
fronto-parietal network only when subjects are conscious of a stimulus 
across different experimental paradigms such as stimulus masking 
(Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Gaillard et al., 2009; Fisch et al., 
2009; Del Cul, Baillet and Dehaene, 2007; Del Cul et al., 2009), 
attentional blink (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004; Sergent, Baillet and 
Dehaene, 2005; Williams et al., 2008), binocular rivalry (Sterzer, 
Kleinschmidt and Rees, 2009), or conscious perception of errors (van 
Gaal et al., 2011; Charles et al., 2013). Furthermore, these results 
have been replicated across different modalities, using conscious and 
subliminal tactile stimuli (Boly et al., 2007) or conscious and sub-
liminal sounds (Sadaghiani, Hesselmann and Kleinschmidt, 2009). 
The hypothesis that the P3b wave is an NCC seems also to be 
supported by a wide array of results across paradigms using visual 
masking, the attentional blink, or conscious perception of errors 
(Sergent, Baillet and Dehaene, 2005; Del Cul, Baillet and Dehaene, 
2007; van Aalderen-Smeets, Oosterweld and Schwarzbach, 2009; 
Bekinschtein et al., 2009; Gaillard et al., 2009; El Karoui et al., 2015). 
For example, when two target stimuli are presented in close temporal 
succession, the second target is often invisible to the subject, a 
phenomenon called ‘attentional blink’. Sergent, Baillet and Dehaene 
(2005) used the attentional blink to demonstrate that the P3b is 
observed only in trials in which subjects report perceiving the second 
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target, and thus conclude that the P3b is an NCC. So far, so good for 
the GNW theory. 
However, all these experiments used both subjective reports of con-
scious perception and the contrastive analysis method. Hence, these 
results are all prone to the measurement problem argument. Since the 
only way to operate the subjective measure is by asking subjects to 
introspect in order for them to report the presence of a conscious 
experience, both the activation of the prefronto-parietal network and 
the P3b wave could result from the use of introspection. In other 
words, both the activation of the prefronto-parietal network and the 
P3b could be methodological artefacts (neural prerequisites, correl-
ates, or consequences of introspection) rather than genuine NCCs. I 
now argue, against the GNW theory, that the activation of the pre-
frontal cortex and the P3b are methodological artefacts. 
I will focus first on the claim that activation of the prefrontal cortex 
is an NCC. In what follows, I both argue that no-report paradigms 
indicate that activation of the prefrontal cortex is not an NCC, and that 
this activation is best explained by the use of introspection in report-
based paradigms. 
The prefrontal cortex is now well-known for its central role in intro-
spection. Results from Fleming, Huijgen and Dolan (2012) showed 
both that the activity of the lateral prefrontal cortex is systematically 
linked to metacognitive accuracy (a subject’s capacity to correctly 
assess her performance on a sensory discrimination task), and that 
functional connectivity between the prefrontal cortex and visual 
cortices increases during metacognitive reports. Confirming these 
results, both Fleming and Dolan (2012) and Baird et al. (2013) found 
that metacognition of perceptual information and memory are sub-
served respectively by the lateral anterior prefrontal cortex and the 
medial anterior prefrontal cortex (see also Valk et al., 2016). Inter-
estingly, individual differences in grey matter volume in the anterior 
prefrontal cortex correlate with differences in metacognitive accuracy 
(Fleming et al., 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013). Furthermore, a study of 
seven patients with lesions of the prefrontal cortex showed a specific 
impairment in metacognitive accuracy on a perceptual discrimination 
task, despite their objective performance being equivalent to healthy 
controls (Fleming et al., 2014). Similarly, using theta-burst trans-
cranial magnetic stimulation to depress activity in the lateral pre-
frontal cortex, Rounis et al. (2010) specifically impaired metacog-
nitive accuracy while subjects still had the same perceptual 
discrimination performance as control subjects. Hence, lesion studies 
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and studies on the neural underpinnings of introspection suggest that 
activity of the prefrontal cortex is a neural correlate of introspection. 
However, lesion studies also seem to indicate that the prefrontal 
cortex is not required for having conscious experiences, as complete 
bilateral frontal lobectomy or large bilateral resection do not seem to 
impair consciousness while affecting executive functions and working 
memory capacities (Müller and Knight, 2006). In a case study by 
Markowitsch and Kessler (2000), a young woman showed preserved 
perceptual abilities and seemed to be perfectly conscious despite 
extensive bilateral damage to her prefrontal cortex. Hence, it seems 
that activity of the prefrontal cortex specifically accounts for intro-
spection of conscious experiences, and not for these experiences being 
conscious in the first place. 
Additional evidence comes from the study of sleep and dreams. 
Activation of the prefrontal cortex does not increase during REM 
sleep (the sleep stage in which subjects dream vividly) (Nir and 
Tononi, 2010), suggesting that having a conscious dream experience 
does not correlate with activations of the prefrontal cortex. Consistent 
with the hypothesis that the activation of the prefrontal cortex could 
be a methodological artefact, the prefrontal cortex is activated during 
lucid dreaming, when subjects are aware of the fact that they are 
dreaming (Dresler et al., 2012). Filevich et al. (2015) recently found 
shared neural mechanisms between lucid dreaming and metacognition 
in the prefrontal cortex, concluding that prefrontal areas could be 
responsible for one’s awareness that one is dreaming without being 
involved in generating the experience of dreaming itself. 
A study by Goldberg, Harel and Malach (2006) is also consistent 
with these results. In this experiment, subjects in an fMRI scanner had 
to categorize pictures under animal/no-animal categories. The experi-
ment had three conditions: first, a slow categorization condition; 
second, an introspection condition, in which subjects had to introspect 
about their emotional responses when presented with the images; 
third, a fast categorization condition, in which the stimulation rate was 
three times faster than in the slow categorization condition. While in 
the introspection condition the prefrontal cortex showed increased 
activity, it was deactivated below the slow condition during the fast 
categorization task. The authors conclude that self-related activity in 
the prefrontal cortex is inhibited during highly demanding sensory 
tasks, thus revealing potential neural underpinnings of the common 
phenomenology of ‘losing oneself in the act’. This finding is at odds 
with the predictions of the GNW theory, as the theory predicts that 
 14 M.  MICHEL 
neural assemblies of the GNW in the prefrontal cortex should display 
increased activity in a sensorily demanding task, and not decreased 
activity. On the contrary, it confirms that prefrontal areas could be 
responsible for introspection, rather than for the conscious character of 
experience. 
The prefrontal involvement in binocular rivalry has also recently 
been challenged in a groundbreaking study by Frässle et al. (2014). 
During binocular rivalry, an image in one eye becomes unconscious 
because of its competition with a rival and incompatible image 
presented in the other eye. The result of binocular rivalry is that 
participants report experiencing temporal alternations between the 
image presented in one eye and the other. When one image is uncon-
scious, the other becomes conscious, it is then possible to study the 
transition of a particular content from unconsciousness to conscious-
ness. Crucially, subjective reports (generally by asking the subject to 
press a button when they become aware of a stimulus) have been 
considered as the only way for the experimenters to know whether the 
image in the right or left eye is being consciously experienced by the 
subject. As noted above, the prefrontal cortex has long been thought to 
be involved in the switch in the content experienced by the subjects 
(Sterzer, Kleinschmidt and Rees, 2009), experiments using binocular 
rivalry are then generally thought as supporting the GNW theory. 
Frässle et al. (2014) hypothesized that activation of the prefrontal 
cortex during perceptual switch in experiments using binocular rivalry 
is not responsible for the change in the content of experience but, 
rather, correlates with introspection. In order to test this hypothesis, 
they developed an ingenious no-report experimental set-up. They used 
results from previous experiments showing that a switch in the content 
experienced by the subject during binocular rivalry can be inferred 
thanks to reflexes such as pupil dilation and ocular micro-saccades 
(Einhäuser et al., 2008; Naber, Frässle and Einhäuser, 2011). It then 
became possible for experimenters to infer which image was con-
sciously experienced by the subject from the observation of subtle 
changes in pupil dilation and ocular micro-saccades. This method was 
used by Frässle et al. in order to determine the NCCs independently of 
the NCIs by contrasting two conditions: an introspection condition in 
which subjects had to report the switch from one image to another, 
and a no-report condition in which they did not. 
Crucially, their result is that the prefrontal cortex is activated only in 
the introspection condition and not in the no-report condition. Frässle 
and co-workers conclude that ‘frontal areas are associated with active 
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report and introspection rather than with rivalry per se’ (Frässle et al., 
2014, p. 1738). Nonetheless, it should be emphasized, first, that some 
prefrontal areas such as the right superior frontal gyrus or the right 
inferior frontal gyrus remained active even during the no-report con-
dition (Zaretskaya and Narinyan, 2014). Second, and more import-
antly, the study by Frässle et al. (2014) addresses the neural correlates 
of the switch in the content of consciousness during binocular rivalry 
rather than neural correlates of the content of consciousness itself 
(Naber and Brascamp, 2015). Despite these mitigating factors, and 
combined with the results by Goldberg, Harel and Malach (2006), it is 
still reasonable to consider that this study casts doubt on the idea that 
activation of the prefrontal cortex is a genuine NCC, and supports the 
hypothesis that it could rather be a methodological artefact. 
Now that a case has been made for considering the activation of the 
prefrontal cortex as a methodological artefact, let me turn to the P3b 
wave. In attentional blink and visual masking experiments, the P3b 
wave seems to be a reliable NCC: this event-related potential (ERP) is 
observed only on trials in which the subject reports being aware of the 
target stimulus (Sergent, Baillet and Dehaene, 2005; Del Cul, Baillet 
and Dehaene, 2007). Nonetheless, it should be noted that the P3b is 
not the only ERP that correlates with visual awareness, other ERPs 
have been proposed, such as the P1 or the visual awareness negativity 
(VAN) (for a review, Railo, Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2011; Rutiku, 
Aru and Bachmann, 2016). I now argue that the P3b is not an NCC 
but a methodological artefact. On my view, the P3b correlates with a 
prerequisite of introspection; namely, with working memory 
encoding, and not with consciousness. 
Before we continue, I have to describe briefly what cognitive 
scientists call ‘working memory’. In a nutshell, working memory is a 
system that underpins many abilities such as reasoning, learning, and 
comprehension. It enables us to keep particular pieces of information 
in mind while manipulating them (Baddeley, 2007). Consequently, 
most of the sustained and high-level processing that is going on in our 
brains is due to representations being encoded and sustained in 
working memory. 
The neural correlates of working memory do not qualify as proper 
NCCs: an NCC is supposed to be minimally sufficient for conscious-
ness, but there are cases in which encoding in working memory does 
not seem to be sufficient for consciousness. Indeed, results indicate 
that items can be unconsciously encoded and sustained briefly in 
working memory (Bergström and Eriksson, 2014; Dutta et al., 2014; 
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Soto and Silvanto, 2014; 2016; Pincham, Bowman and Szucz, 2016), 
an hypothesis that is now also supported by proponents of the GNW 
theory themselves (King, Pescetelli and Dehaene, 2016). Now, the 
crucial point is that encoding information in working memory (or 
update of the content of working memory) reliably correlates with the 
P3b (Polich, 2007). 
Against the GNW theory, recent evidence suggests that the P3b is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Complex uncon-
scious processing of a stimulus can evoke the P3b (Silverstein et al., 
2015; 2016). Hence, the P3b does not seem to be sufficient for con-
sciousness. Moreover, the P3b does not correlate with conscious per-
ception when subjects consciously see the stimulus but a representa-
tion of the target stimulus is already encoded in working memory 
(Melloni et al., 2011), suggesting that the P3b does not systematically 
correlate with consciousness but better correlates with working 
memory encoding. This hypothesis is further supported by the finding 
that task-irrelevant stimuli (i.e. stimuli that need not be reported or 
encoded in working memory) do not trigger the P3b wave (Pitts, 
Martínez and Hillyard, 2012; Shafto and Pitts, 2015) although subjects 
are aware of them (Pitts, Metzler and Hillyard, 2014; Pitts et al., 
2014). The P3b could then correlate with working memory update 
rather than conscious awareness. 
I now argue that working memory update is a prerequisite of intro-
spection. Although the study of the electrophysiology of introspection 
is still at an early stage of its development, evidence suggests that 
introspection correlates with the P3 wave (Overgaard, 2006; Desender 
et al., 2016). It is plausible that it is necessary to encode a representa-
tion in working memory for subsequent introspection and report, 
which would explain the correlation between introspection and the P3 
wave. Indeed, if working memory update elicits the P3b, and if 
working memory encoding is necessary for introspection, then intro-
spection should aways co-occur with the P3b. Although this claim is 
still speculative, a study by Maniscalco and Lau (2015) addressing the 
link between working memory and introspection could bring some 
support for it. In this study, Maniscalco and Lau analysed the effects 
of both working memory load and manipulation demands on meta-
cognitive accuracy. The results indicate that metacognitive perform-
ance was selectively impaired under high working memory manipula-
tion demands. The experimenters conclude that: 
the same processes involved in manipulating and reorganizing working 
memory contents might also be involved in manipulating and 
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reorganizing sensory representations for the purposes of metacognitive 
evaluation. (ibid., p. 11) 
Hence, introspection could draw on the resources of working memory, 
with working memory encoding thus being a prerequisite of intro-
spection. The P3b seems to correlate with task-relevance and working 
memory encoding, which may be a prerequisite of introspection, and 
not with conscious perception itself. Thus, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that the P3b is more likely to be a methodological artefact than a 
genuine NCC. 
In this section I argued that both activation of the prefrontal cortex 
and the P3b, considered as NCCs by the GNW theory, are methodol-
ogical artefacts. On the one hand, activation of the prefrontal cortex is 
likely to be a neural correlate of introspection rather than a genuine 
NCC. On the other hand, the P3b wave does not correlate with con-
scious perception but with working memory encoding, which may be 
a prerequisite of introspection. 
The methodological artefact argument is based on an inference to 
the best explanation, which, in the case of the GNW, depends on the 
results reviewed above. These results should be treated with caution: 
fMRI and EEG recordings are coarse measures of neural activity, and 
it could be that further enquiry with more sensitive measures would be 
able to demonstrate frontal activity independent of introspection 
(although it is difficult to assess whether a subject is introspecting or 
not without a report) (e.g. Cortese et al., 2016). Nonetheless, 
independently of these experimental worries, I hope that the argu-
ments I provided can serve as a way to illustrate the importance of the 
measurement problem in consciousness science. I now conclude with 
some considerations on different possibilities to disentangle NCCs 
from methodological artefacts. 
4. Conclusion: How to Disentangle NCCs 
from Methodological Artefacts 
How can we disentangle NCCs from methodological artefacts? 
Report-based paradigms alone won’t do it, because they are the very 
source of methodological artefacts in consciousness science. But no-
report paradigms alone won’t do it neither. Indeed, as noted by 
Overgaard and Fazekas (2016), nothing rules out that in no-report 
paradigms subjects are still introspecting or reflecting on their own 
conscious experiences. Rather, I suggest that a good start would be to 
study the neural states that underly introspection. Most of our worries 
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would be dramatically reduced if we had a way of knowing how 
exactly introspection is modifying conscious experience and the 
neural states by which introspection is realized. Studying introspection 
will be necessary for further scientific enquiry on the neural basis of 
consciousness. One should also combine the study of the neural basis 
of introspection with a systematic comparison of the results from 
report-based and no-report paradigms in order to assess their con-
sistency (Tsuchiya et al., 2016). Using results from different sources 
of knowledge will undoubtedly bring progress in consciousness 
science (Block et al., 2014; Koch et al., 2016). If evidence from 
report-based and no-report paradigms is inconsistent, it is possible, 
from our knowledge of the neural prerequisites, correlates, and con-
sequences of introspection, to argue that report-based paradigms 
uncover methodological artefacts rather than NCCs. This is the 
strategy I tried to apply here to the NCCs put forward by the GNW 
theory. Crucially, this methodology could help solve only one of the 
many problems we face in the quest for NCCs; namely, the problem 
of confounding NCCs with methodological artefacts. As I argued in 
the first section, there are many other ways in which the search for 
NCCs can go wrong, and a great deal of additional work is needed to 
unravel genuine NCCs from confounding factors. 
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